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I. INTRODUCTION
We need to think this through .... Why not let a
family stay in their own home and maintain it - and
provide the bank some revenue - rather than let
that home sit empty and become a blight on the
neighborhood and possibly a haven for criminals,
drugs, and gangs? And if these servicers, some of
which have taken billions of dollars in taxpayer
bailouts, refuse to meet the foreclosure-reduction
standards and goals they have signed up for under
the Administration plan, then there need to be some
penalties for non-compliance.'
Senator Durbin's comments reflect the frustration of many
policy makers over the limited progress of government initiatives
to stem the foreclosure crisis. In his commentary, Senator Durbin
refers to the possibility of allowing homeowners to rent their
former home after foreclosure.' Such a policy is commonly called
* This Note is part of the North Carolina Banking Institute Symposium on the
Foreclosure Crisis.
1. Press Release, Sen. Dick Durbin, Durbin Discusses Next Steps to Address
Foreclosure Crisis (Sept. 2, 2009), http://durbin.senate.gov/showRelease.cfm?release
Id=317467.
2. See Dean Baker & Andrew Samwick, Baker and Samwick: Save the
Homeowners, Not the Hedge Funds, PROVIDENCE J., Aug. 31, 2007, http://www.pro
jo.com/opinion/contributors/content/C baker3_08-31-07_8G6SA61.lcld9dc.html
(providing Andrew Samwick's endorsement of adopting a right to rent policy.
Samwick served as Chief Economist of the Staff of the President's Council of
Economic Advisors under George W. Bush.); see Patrick Rucker, Sen. Schumer:
Defaulting Homeowners Could Rent Home, REUTERS, July 16, 2009,
http://www.reuters.com/article/GCA-Housing/idUSTRE56F3JA20090716
(mentioning Sen. Schumer's support for a right to rent policy).
3. See Durbin, supra note 1.
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a "right to rent" plan.4 Dean Baker, co-director of the Center for
Economic Policy Research,5 first advocated a right to rent plan in
2007 as a means to combat the emerging foreclosure crisis.6 The
idea has garnered renewed interest the past several months and
continues to attract a variety of supporters.7
Under a right to rent policy, homeowners facing
foreclosure remain in their homes as renters for an extended
period of time.8 Baker has refrained from suggesting an exact
length to the right to rent or how the duration would be
determined, but has given examples ranging from five years9 to
"indefinitely."1 ° A right to rent policy permits judges hearing
foreclosure proceedings to grant mortgagors facing foreclosure the
option to remain in their homes as tenants paying rent at a fair-
market rate." While the lender would be able to sell the property
after foreclosure, the tenant's rights would not terminate after the
sale, and subsequent purchasers would be required to respect the
tenant's right to rent for the stipulated duration." Lenders that
proceed with foreclosure actions, therefore, run the risk of
4. DEAN BAKER, THE RIGHT TO RENT PLAN 1 (Center for Economic and Policy
Research 2009), http://www.cepr.net/documents/publications/right-to-rent-2009-
07.pdf [hereinafter BAKER, PLAN].
5. Center for Economic and Policy Research, About Us, http://www.cepr.net/
index.php/about-us/ (last visited Jan. 10, 2010) (describing the Center for Economic
and Policy Research's mission "to promote democratic debate on the most important
economic and social issues that affect people's lives ... [by] conduct[ing] both
professional research and public education").
6. Dean Baker, Co-Dir., Ctr. for Econ. & Policy Research, The Subprime
Borrower Protection Plan (Aug. 20, 2007), http://www.cepr.net/index.php/op-eds-&-
columns/op-eds-&-columns/the-subprime-borrower-protection-plan/ [hereinafter
Baker, Subprime Protection].
7. See Daniel Alpert, Why Own When You Can Lease?, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 1,
2009, at A17, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/08/01/opinion/Olalpert.html
?_r=l; Simon Johnson & Alex Stricker, How to Mop Up Foreclosure Flood,
BLOOMBERG, Nov. 17, 2008, http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601039&
refer=columnistand&sid=aiKFOhBcR_Z8; Benny L. Kass, Establishing a Distressed
Homeowner's 'Right to Rent', WASH. POST, Aug. 1, 2009, http://www.washington
post.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/07/30/AR2009073004333.html.
8. BAKER, PLAN, supra note 4, at 1.
9. Id. at 2.
10. Dean Baker, Subprime Borrowers Deserve an Own to Rent Transition,
ECONOMISTS' VOICE, Feb. 2008, at 2, available at http://www.bepress.com/ev/vol5/
issl/art5/ [hereinafter Baker, Own to Rent].
11. BAKER, PLAN, supra note 4, at 2.
12. Id.
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acquiring a property with tenants. An outcome where
foreclosures resulted in mortgagors becoming renters would make
the prospect of foreclosure less appealing to lenders, since a
property with tenants is less attractive to potential buyers. 4 A
right to rent policy, therefore, would increase incentives for
lenders to renegotiate mortgages by imposing additional burdens
on lenders who proceed with foreclosures on defaulting
homeowners.' 5
Part II of this Note analyzes the right to rent proposal, its
benefits and its drawbacks.16 Part III describes recent efforts by
government-sponsored entities to implement right to rent
policies.17 Part IV of this Note compares the Neighborhood
Preservation Act with Baker's proposal.'8 Part V concludes that
while it would provide additional incentives for lenders to
renegotiate mortgages, the right to rent plan's success may be
limited due to the same challenges facing existing policies focused
on mortgage renegotiation.' 9
II. THE RIGHT TO RENT PLAN
The right to rent plan would allow judges hearing
foreclosure actions to permit homeowners to remain in their
homes as tenants paying market-rate rent following foreclosure.°
Dean Baker, an economist and co-director of the Center for
Economic and Policy Research, first proposed the right to rent
plan in 2007 as a means of combating the emerging foreclosure
crisis.2' Baker suggests that the former homeowner's right to rent
the foreclosed home should extend for a "substantial period of
13. See id.
14. Baker, Own to Rent, supra note 10, at 2-3; Nicholas Weaver, Letter to the
Editor, Baker's 'Own to Rent' Proposal is Economically Inefficient, ECONOMISTS'
VOICE, July 2008, at 1, available at http://www.bepress.com/ev/vol5/iss3/art3/.
15. Baker, Own to Rent, supra note 10, at 2-3.
16. See infra Part II, pp. 221-28.
17. See infra Part III, pp. 228-33.
18. See infra Part IV, pp. 234-35.
19. See infra Part V, pp. 235-36.
20. See BAKER, PLAN, supra note 4, at 1.
21. Baker, Subprime Protection, supra note 6.
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time."22 Baker proposed that the right to rent plan should extend
at least five years 23 and possibly "as long as [former homeowners]
want., 24 Under Baker's proposal, the market-rental rate would be
initially established by an "independent appraiser" and adjusted
annually based on the Consumer Price Index for rental prices in
the home's region.5 Either party could apply to pay for an
additional appraisal in the event that party feels the established
market rate is unfair.26
A. The Potential Advantages of the Right to Rent Plan
Like existing government initiatives, the main goal of the
right to rent policy is to keep families in their homes.27 Unlike
current policies, however, the plan does not directly attempt to
prevent home foreclosures through renegotiation. 28  Another
major difference between the right to rent plan and current
government policies is that while families maintain residence in the
same home, they transition from homeowners to renters under the
plan.29
This outcome may seem undesirable based on the societal
value placed on homeownership, yet, one justification for the right
to rent policy is that it avoids rewarding either lenders or
borrowers for making risky choices.3 ° The right to rent plan bails
out neither the borrower who purchased a home they were unable
to afford nor the lender who made risky loans.3' Following a
foreclosure under the right to rent plan, the borrower no longer
owns the home, and the lender acquires a tenant-occupied home
rather than being able to sell the property free and clear.32
22. BAKER, PLAN, supra note 4, at 2.
23. Id. at 1.
24. Baker, Subprime Protection, supra note 6.
25. BAKER, PLAN, supra note 4, at 2.
26. Id.
27. See id. at 1.
28. See id.
29. See id.
30. See id. at 2.
31. BAKER, PLAN, supra note 4, at 2.
32. Id.
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Arguably, tenant-occupied homes may result in certain
advantages to lenders by keeping homes occupied during the
housing downturn.33 For instance, occupied properties may reduce
the likelihood of vandalism and neglect that can occur during
vacancy.m Additionally, a tenant provides lenders rental income
that would not be recovered if the home remained vacant and
unsold.35 Renting the property may provide lenders with a
desirable alternative to selling the property for a loss in the current
housing market, by allowing the tenant to pay rent while the
market possibly rebounds.36  While the right to rent plan
potentially represents a mutually beneficial outcome for lenders
and borrowers,37 analysts are concerned that many lenders do not
view tenant-occupied homes as advantageous.38
An underlying goal of the right to rent plan is to create
additional incentives to encourage lenders to renegotiate
mortgages facing foreclosure. 39  The prospect of a mortgagor
becoming a tenant and the associated costs of the new landlord-
tenant relationship makes the process of foreclosure less appealing
to creditors.40 Therefore, by increasing lenders' costs to complete a
foreclosure, the right to rent plan incentivizes renegotiating
mortgages for lenders.41
In order for the right to rent plan to increase incentives to
encourage lenders to renegotiate mortgages, the assumption that
tenant-occupied homes are less desirable to lenders must hold
33. See Barbara Kiviat, Renting Your House Back: A Solution to Foreclosures?,
TIME, Nov. 12, 2009, http://www.time.comltimebusiness/article/0,8599,1938255,0
0.html.
34. See id.; S. Adeline McKinney, The North Carolina Banking Institute
Symposium on the Foreclosure Crisis: Municipalities Fight Effects of Foreclosure
Blighted Neighborhoods with Neighborhood Stabilization Program Grants and
Litigation Against Banks, 14 NC BANK. INST., 257, 257 (2010).
35. See Kiviat, supra note 33.
36. See id.
37. See id.
38. See, e.g., Baker, Own to Rent, supra note 10, at 2-3 (describing lenders'
reluctance to become landlords); Kiviat, supra note 33 (quoting JPMorgan Chase
spokesman Tom Kelly, "We're in the lending business. We're not equipped to be
landlords.").
39. See BAKER, PLAN, supra note 4, at 1.
40. Baker, Own to Rent, supra note 10, at 2-3.
41. See BAKER, PLAN, supra note 4, at 1.
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true." Baker and others make this argument and assert that home
value is reduced when the home is occupied by tenants during
resale." Anecdotally, realtors support this contention.4 Realtors
argue that tenant-occupied homes are often more difficult to sell
because the pool of prospective buyers is smaller for tenant-
occupied homes compared to properties available for immediate
occupancy, the transaction costs for purchasing tenant-occupied
homes are higher, and prospective buyers are often hesitant
because tenant-occupied homes sell for less than vacant homes.45
Additionally, lenders may be unprepared to transition to the role
46of landlord and likely face costs in doing so, such as the cost of
hiring a property-management company.47 By becoming landlords,
lenders also face new obligations to repair and maintain homes.
The right to rent plan also hopes to reduce blight in
communities facing large numbers of foreclosures.49 By keeping
families in homes, the plan hopes to avoid the problems facing
many regions experiencing large numbers of foreclosures and
associated home vacancies. °  Concentrations of foreclosed
properties negatively impact nearby home prices and decrease the
municipal tax base.5 The Center for Responsible Lending projects
that the foreclosures that occurred in 2009 will negatively affect
the value of 69.5 million neighboring homes. 2 An analysis of the
42. See generally Baker, Own to Rent, supra note 10, at 2-3 (describing Baker's
belief that most lenders do not wish to acquire tenant-occupied properties, which will
make renegotiation more likely).
43. See, e.g., id. ("They can sell the property, but the tenant would go with it,
which substantially reduces its market value.").
44. See, e.g., Charlotte Laws, Clueless at City Hall: Foreclosures and Tenants, AM.
CHRON., July 27, 2009, http://www.americanchronicle.com/articles/view/111812
(discussing issues that arise in the resale of tenant-occupied properties).
45. See id.
46. Kiviat, supra note 33.
47. Id. (discussing Fannie Mae's hiring of a property-management company to
handle participants in its Deed for Lease Program).
48. See id.
49. BAKER, PLAN, supra note 4, at 1.
50. See id.
51. Benjamin Bernanke, Chairman, Fed. Reserve, Remarks at the Independent
Community Bankers of America Annual Convention: Reducing Preventable
Mortgage Foreclosures (Mar. 4, 2008), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/
newsevents/speechlbernanke200803O4a.htm; see also S. Adeline McKinney, supra
note 34, at 257-58, (discussing the impact of foreclosure on municipalities).
52. CTR. FOR RESPONSIBLE LENDING, SOARING SPILLOVER: ACCELERATING
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foreclosure process in Chicago found that a foreclosure resulted in
"direct municipal costs that in some cases exceed[ed] $30,000 per
property.
5 3
Finally, advocates of the plan argue that it is cost effective
for taxpayers and the government.-4 By using existing judicial
processes, the plan can be implemented at little cost.55 Unlike
other interventions, which have required large influxes of money
from the government,5 6 the right to rent plan is a cost-effective
option.57
B. Criticisms of the Right to Rent Plan
1. Economic Inefficiency
The right to rent plan has been criticized as economically
inefficient.58 The plan arguably places a large burden on lenders
with limited relief to borrowers.5 9 Lenders may be exposed to
thousands of dollars of cost, while former homeowners could find
equivalent housing at the market rate while incurring limited
additional cost.0  The costs faced by lenders include hiring
property managers to handle their tenant-occupied properties,6'
maintenance costs,6' and losses in resale value. 63 Borrowers who
FORECLOSURES COST NEIGHBORS $502 BILLION IN 2009 ALONE 1 (2009),
http://www.responsiblelending.org/mortgage-lending/research-analysis/soaring-spill
over-3-09.pdf.
53. WILLIAM C. APGAR & MARK DUDA, COLLATERAL DAMAGE: THE MUNICIPAL
IMPACT OF TODAY'S MORTGAGE FORECLOSURE BOOM 4 (Homeownership
Preservation Foundation 2005), http://www.995hope.org/content/pdf/Apgar-Duda_
StudyShortVersion.pdf.
54. BAKER, PLAN, supra note 4, at 1.
55. Id. at 2.
56. See Renae Merle, Banks Slow to Modify Mortgages, WASH. POST, Aug. 5,
2009, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/08/04/AR200908
0401134.htmi.
57. BAKER, PLAN, supra note 4, at 2.
58. Weaver, supra note 14, at 1.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 1-2.
61. See Kiviat, supra note 33.
62. See id. (discussing the reluctance of lenders to incur liability for maintenance
costs).
63. See, e.g., Baker, Own to Rent, supra note 10, at 2-3 (stating that the presence
of tenants negatively impacts resale value).
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must vacate the property, on the other hand, face costs from
locating a residence to rent and relocation.64
2. Logistical Barriers
The plan also ignores some logistical barriers. Baker's
proposal does not explicitly recognize some of the transactional
costs that lenders may incur as landlords.65 For example, the plan
does not account for property management costs. 66 The right to
rent plan also may ignore homeowners' association bylaws, local
ordinances, and other regulations that would make the transition
to renting the property more burdensome.67  These criticisms,
however, may simply demonstrate the plan's underlying goal of
encouraging mortgage renegotiation. 68
C. Differences From Existing Federal Programs
Unlike existing federal programs which attempt to
incentivize lender participation, the right to rent plan would
enable courts to compel participation.6 9 A lender who proceeds
with a foreclosure action would be bound to the court's imposition
of a right to rent.7° The right to rent plan would not create a
government program for lenders, but rather provides courts with a
means of establishing a right to rent to keep former homeowners
in their homes as tenants for an extended period of time.7
Assuming lenders wish to avoid acquisition of tenant-occupied
64. Weaver, supra note 14, at 1-2.
65. See Baker, Own to Rent, supra note 10, at 2-3.
66. See Kiviat, supra note 33 (discussing Fannie Mae's hiring of a property-
management company to manage its tenant-occupied properties under the Deed for
Lease Program).
67. Compare FANNIE MAE, ANNOUNCEMENT 09-33, AMENDS THESE GUIDES:
SERVICING: NEW DEED-FOR-LEASE PROGRAM 2 (2009), https://www.efannie
mae.com/sf/guides/ssg/annltrs/pdf/2009/0933.pdf [hereinafter FANNIE MAE,
ANNOUNCEMENT 09-33] (excluding properties with zoning or home owner association
limitations that would interfere with the Deed for Lease Program) , with BAKER,
PLAN, supra note 4, at 1-2 (placing no explicit limitations on eligible properties on the
basis of zoning or home owner association prohibitions).
68. See BAKER, PLAN, supra note 4, at 1.
69. See id. at 2.
70. See id.
71. See id. at 1-2.
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homes, the threat of a court-imposed right to rent may provide
homeowners facing foreclosure with increased bargaining power.
The right to rent plan, unlike current government
initiatives, also penalizes lenders who fail to renegotiate.73 The
right to rent plan, therefore, rests somewhere between existing
government programs that reward voluntary renegotiation 7 4 and
mortgage cramdowns, which result in involuntary renegotiation of
mortgage terms.7 ' The decision to renegotiate or to foreclose with
the possibility of a court-ordered right to rent remains in the sole
discretion of the lender.76 The court-imposed declaration of a right
to rent is effectively a penalty to the lender for pursuing
foreclosure. This "stick" encourages lenders to renegotiate
mortgage terms, complementing the government's "carrots" for
77voluntary action under existing programs.
The right to rent plan places more power in the courts
while decreasing lenders' autonomy.78 Judges would be provided
with an additional option in determining the outcome of any
foreclosure hearings lenders pursue.79 If Baker's assumption that
tenant-occupied homes are less attractive to lenders is true to the
extent that lenders will renegotiate mortgages to avoid foreclosure
under the right to rent plan,8° then the right to rent plan makes
72. See BAKER, PLAN, supra note 4, at 1.
73. See Baker, Own to Rent, supra note 10, at 2-3.
74. See, e.g., Michael M. Phillips & Ruth Simon, Mortgage Bailout to Aid 1 in 9
U.S. Homeowners, WALL ST. J., Mar. 5, 2009, at Al, available at http://online.wsj.com/
article/SB123617623602129441.html (describing the incentives created for lenders
and mortgage servicers under Making Home Affordable).
75. See Adam J. Levitin, Resolving the Foreclosure Crisis: Modification of
Mortgages in Bankruptcy, 2009 Wis. L. REV. 565, 619 (2009). See generally Marjorie
B. Maynard, Note, The North Carolina Banking Institute Symposium on the
Foreclosure Crisis: Mortgage Cramdown in Bankruptcy as a Necessary Incentive to
Encourage Mortgage Modifications, 14 N.C. BANKING INST. 275 (2010) (providing
additional discussion of proposals to permit home mortgage cramdowns in
bankruptcy court).
76. See BAKER, PLAN, supra note 4, at 1-2.
77. See Kathryn E. Johnson & Carolyn E. Waldrep, Note, The North Carolina
Banking Institute Symposium on the Foreclosure Crisis: Overview, 14 N.C. BANKING
INST. 191, 203-13, (2010) (describing incentives provided to lenders and servicers for
renegotiating mortgages in default).
78. Cf Levitin, supra note 75, at 619 ("Bankruptcy is merely a forced workout,
which limits lender control of the negotiation.").
79. See BAKER, PLAN, supra note 4, at 2.
80. See id. at 1.
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mortgage renegotiation less voluntary than current policies. While
the plan would not force negotiation of the mortgage terms as in a
mortgage cramdown,8' giving judges the option to allow a right to
rent would remove some control from lenders.82
Baker argues the right to rent plan would also increase
mortgagors' bargaining power.83 If mortgagors demonstrate the
ability to pay market rate rent and state they will seek a right to
rent ruling in a foreclosure action, they may have increased
bargaining power with lenders hoping to avoid becoming the
landlord of a foreclosed property.84 Since a home with tenants is a
less attractive option to lenders,85 lenders may thus be more willing
to renegotiate the terms of the mortgage before proceeding with a
foreclosure action and be more willing to avail themselves of
government incentives to renegotiate. 86
III. RIGHT TO RENT PROGRAMS IN GOVERNMENT-SPONSORED
ENTITIES
A. Freddie Mac's REO Rental Initiative
In March 2009, Freddie Mac introduced a program called
the REO Rental Initiative.87 The REO Rental Initiative, like
Baker's right to rent plan, allows former homeowners facing
foreclosure to transition to tenants.8 Under the REO Rental
Initiative, former homeowners enter a lease agreement to become
month-to-month tenants.89
81. See Levitin, supra note 75, at 619.
82. Cf. id. (stating that bankruptcy acts as a "forced workout, which limits lender
control of the negotiation").
83. BAKER, PLAN, supra note 4, at 1.
84. See id.
85. See Baker, Own to Rent, supra note 10, at 2-3.
86. See BAKER, PLAN,supra note 4, at 1.
87. Press Release, Freddie Mac, Freddie Mac Officially Launches REO Rental
Initiative for Tenants, Owner-Occupants After Foreclosure (Mar. 5, 2009),
http://www.freddiemac.com/news/archives/servicing/2009/20090305_reo-rental-
initiative.html [hereinafter Freddie Mac, Launches REO].
88. Id.
89. Freddie Mac, REO Rental Initiative, http://www.freddiemac.com/corporate/
buyown/english/avoiding-foreclosure/rentalinitiative.html (last visited Jan. 10,
2010).
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The REO Rental Initiative has a number of conditions for
homeowners' and properties' eligibility.90 To become tenants
under the REO Rental Initiative, homeowners must, (1)
"[d]emonstrate the ability to pay the market rent[;]" (2) "[a]llow
an inspector to enter and inspect the property[;]" (3) "[s]ign a
separate lease agreement[;]" (4) "[s]ign a property condition
disclosure at the time of the inspection[;]" and (5) "[a]llow future
showings of the property to prospective buyers and real estate
agents[.]" 91 Property qualifying for the program must "be in good
condition, meet all state laws and local code requirements for
rental properties, and be free of all environmental hazards.",
The program has at least one limitation that is a
disadvantage to homeowners facing foreclosure.9 Former
homeowners who participate in the REO Rental Initiative can
only remain in the home on a month-to-month basis, 94 compared
to Baker's proposal to allow homeowners to occupy the home as
tenants for a term ranging from five years
9' to "indefinitely." 96
This factor alone may diminish the potential benefits for
homeowners facing foreclosure. While both plans would provide
homeowners facing foreclosure with some security, the REO
Rental Initiative would eliminate the shift in incentives under
Baker's plan for lenders to renegotiate mortgages rather than
proceed with foreclosures. 97 While Freddie Mac has not released
specific data on participation rates in the REO Rental Initiative,
initial reports support the assumption that the month-to-month




93. Compare Freddie Mac, Launches REO, supra note 87 (describing the month-
to-month tenancy of the program), with BAKER, PLAN, supra note 4, at 2 ("Gives
homeowners facing foreclosure the option of renting their home for a substantial
period of time (e.g. 5 to 10 years) at the market rate.").
94. Freddie Mac, Launches REO, supra note 87; see also Kass, supra note 7
("However, until Freddie determines how long the homeowner can remain in the
house, the lease is only month to month. That means that in most cases, when the
house is sold, the tenants will be required to vacate -- unless, of course, the buyer is
an investor and willing to allow the lease to remain in effect.").
95. BAKER, PLAN, supra note 4, at 2.
96. Baker, Own to Rent, supra note 10, at 2.
97. See id. at 2-3 (describing the right to rent's impact of making foreclosure a
less attractive option to lenders who wish to avoid becoming landlords).
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participants in the program." As one report noted, "most
occupants have chosen 'cash for keys' over the relative instability
of a month-to-month rental agreement. ' 99
The REO Rental Initiative, unlike Baker's proposed right
to rent plan, is not intended to combat the foreclosure crisis.' °
The REO Rental Initiative was "not meant to be a structural
answer to the deluge of homes moving through foreclosure.
1°1
Rather, the program simply grants participating former
homeowners additional time to relocate while Freddie Mac resells
the property. Freddie Mac designed the REO Rental Initiative
to benefit itself;03 and the program's design avoids the
disincentives of pursuing a foreclosure created under Baker's plan.
Under the REO Rental Initiative, Freddie Mac avoids the
potential costs of leaving homes vacant and benefits from rental
revenue while the house awaits resale. °4 At the same time,
Freddie Mac does not incur a substantial cost that would result
under Baker's right to rent plan-acquiring a long-term tenant who
would retain the right to rent the property after resale.05
Regardless of the REO Rental Initiative's disadvantages
relative to Dean Baker's right to rent plan, Freddie Mac's failure
to report data regarding the REO Rental Initiative frustrates
attempts to evaluate its impact on former homeowners. For
example, Freddie Mac has not revealed the number of former
homeowners who have used the REO Rental Initiative.100 The
lack of such data also makes it difficult to compare the relative
98. Harry Terris, GSEs Find Seized Homes Easier to Empty than Rent, AM.
BANKER, Oct. 14, 2009, available at 2009 WLNR 20212557 (discussing the relatively
low number of former tenants and borrowers participating in Freddie Mac's
program).




103. See id. ("Rental arrangements may let lenders and investors unload
properties 'in a more controlled fashion for a better price,' particularly in
neighborhoods that have been hit hard by a glut of homes going on the market,
depressing prices, [said Steven Home, President of Wingspan Portfolio Advisors,
LLC].").
104. See Kiviat, supra note 33.
105. See Baker, Own to Rent, supra note 10, at 2-3.
106. See Kiviat, supra note 33.
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success of the REO Rental Initiative to other programs targeted at
assisting homeowners facing foreclosure.
B. Fannie Mae's Deed for Lease Program
In November 2009, Fannie Mae announced a version of the
right to rent plan called the Deed for Lease Program (D4L).107
D4L is intended for homeowners facing foreclosure who are
unable to obtain mortgage modifications through other
programs. As under Baker's proposal, homeowners
participating in D4L transition from homeowners to tenants. 1°9
Under D4L, after the homeowner transfers the property through a
deed-in-lieu of foreclosure, the homeowner may remain in the
home as a tenant for a term of twelve months.110
To qualify for D4L, the property and homeowner must
meet a number of requirements."' D4L makes the following
requirements for properties to be eligible to participate in the
program:
[(1)] There are no zoning or homeowner's
association (HOA) rental limitations that would
prohibit a D4L. [(2)] Repairs required to make the
property habitable are deemed to be in an
acceptable amount based on the property value.
[(3)] The property is in compliance with local rules
and laws or can be brought into compliance within
30 days. [(4)] The property is not within a target
area for any corporate, government or community
neighborhood stabilization plan which may need the
property as part of the plan for purposes other than
residential. [(5)] The rental income from the
107. See Press Release, Fannie Mae, Fannie Mae Announces Deed for Lease
Program (Nov. 5, 2009), http://www.fanniemae.com/newsreleases/2009/4844.jhtml
[hereinafter Fannie Mae, D4L].
108. Id.
109. Compare BAKER, PLAN, supra note 4, at 1, with FANNIE MAE,
ANNOUNCEMENT 09-33, supra note 67, at 1 (describing the transition from
homeowner to tenant).
110. FANNIE MAE, ANNOUNCEMENT 09-33, supra note 67, at 1.
111. Id. at2.
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property is anticipated to cover ongoing
maintenance and management costs.
12
In addition to meeting requirements for the property,
participation in D4L requires that occupants meet the following
criteria:
[(1)] The occupant's income is sufficient to cover
rental payments of not more than [thirty-one]
percent of gross income. If the rental payment is
greater than [thirty-one] percent of the occupant's
monthly gross income, a lease will not be offered.
[(2)] Inspection of the property indicates that the
occupants have been keeping the property in good
condition. [(3)] The occupant agrees to be
responsible for regular maintenance, to keep the
property in good condition, and to permit marketing
of the property for sale. [(4)] The number of
occupants is appropriate for the home and in
compliance with local laws and homeowner
association rules. [(5)] If pets are present, renter's
insurance is obtained if required. [(6)] The
occupants signing the lease must agree to a credit
review and all occupants over the age of [eighteen]
must have an acceptable background check
including receiving clearance from the Office of
Foreign Assets Control. [(7)] There are no signs or
reports of illegal activities conducted at the
property. [(8)] The property is to be used as a
primary residence." 3
Like Freddie Mac's REO Rental Initiative, D4L does not
offer renters as long of a term of tenancy as Baker's proposed five
years T1 to "indefinitely."'' 5  By offering a twelve-month lease,
112. Id at 2-3.
113. Id. at 3.
114. BAKER, PLAN, supra note 4, at 2.
115. Baker, Own to Rent, supra note 10, at 2.
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however, D4L does provide greater security than the REO Rental
Initiative's month-to-month lease. 116  Like the REO Rental
Initiative, the shorter term of tenancy under D4L relative to the
longer term recommended by Baker makes D4L less
advantageous to homeowners facing foreclosure than Baker's right
to rent plan.17 Former homeowners who participate in the D4L
program agree to a term of twelve months 18 with the potential
option to extend to a month-to-month tenancy following the
original term."9 As with the REO Rental Initiative, the shorter
term of tenancy may diminish or eliminate the incentives created
under Baker's proposal for lenders to renegotiate mortgages
rather than proceeding with foreclosures. Fannie Mae markets
D4L as an alternative for those unable to secure modification
under existing programs12' and Fannie Mae will likely benefit from
122tenant occupancy under D4L while the housing market recovers.
Therefore, D4L serves as a means for Fannie Mae to benefit from
homeowners ineligible for mortgage modification rather than
create an incentive to encourage increased mortgage
modifications.
IV. THE NEIGHBORHOOD PRESERVATION ACT
Congress is currently considering legislation that would
impact the creation of right to rent programs. The
116. Compare, FANNIE MAE, ANNOUNCEMENT 09-33, supra note 67, at 1
(describing the length of a D4L lease as twelve months), with Freddie Mac, Launches
REO, supra note 87 (describing the program's month-to-month tenancy).
117. Compare FANNIE MAE, ANNOUNCEMENT 09-33, supra note 67, at 1, and
Freddie Mac, Launches REO, supra note 87, with BAKER, PLAN, supra note 4, at 1
("The right to rent for a substantial period of time also would give homeowners much
more bargaining power when trying to work out mortgage modifications, resulting in
far more homeowners avoiding foreclosure altogether.").
118. FANNIE MAE, ANNOUNCEMENT 09-33, supra note 67, at 2.
119. Fannie Mae, D4L, supra note 107.
120. See BAKER, PLAN, supra note 4, at 1 ("The right to rent for a substantial
period of time also would give homeowners much more bargaining power when
trying to work out mortgage modifications, resulting in far more homeowners
avoiding foreclosure altogether.").
121. Fannie Mae, D4L, supra note 107.
122. See Kiviat, supra note 33.
123. See Neighborhood Preservation Act, H.R. 2529, 111th Cong. (as referred to S.
Comm. on Banking, Hous., and Urban Affairs July 30,2009).
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Neighborhood Preservation Act, introduced by Representative
Gary Miller of California passed the House of Representatives and
was referred to the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and
Urban Affairs in July 2009.12' The Neighborhood Preservation Act
authorizes banks to lease foreclosed properties for up to five
years.'2 The bill would also allow leases with options to
purchase."2 6
The Neighborhood Preservation Act differs from Baker's
proposed right to rent plan in a number of ways. First, the bill
allows banks to lease the foreclosed property to anyone, not just
former homeowners.'27 Second, the bill permits for leases with an
option to purchase .12  Third, the bill sets five years as the
maximum length of a lease. 129 Finally, the bill authorizes banks to
lease foreclosed properties but does not grant courts hearing
foreclosures with the authority to grant homeowners facing
foreclosure with a right to rent.130
While potentially offering stability to families facing
foreclosure, the Neighborhood Preservation Act was primarily
intended to help stabilize the housing market.' The bill,
therefore, would facilitate the development of additional programs
by lending institutions to lease foreclosed properties,"' but would
not create a court-imposed right to rent. Like Freddie Mac's REO
Rental Initiative and Fannie Mae's D4L, the programs created
under the Neighborhood Preservation Act would presumably aim
to provide the lenders with the benefits of acquiring tenant-
occupied properties, avoiding damage that occurs to vacant
properties and collecting rent, while waiting for the housing
market to recover. 33 Like the REO Rental Initiative and D4L, the
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Id. at § 3(a).
127. Id. (providing that banks "may lease to any individual").
128. Id.
129. H.R. 2529 § 3(a).
130. See id. (permitting depository institutions to rent properties).
131. See Press Release, Gary Miller, U.S. Rep. (R-CA), House Unanimously
Passes the Neighborhood Preservation Act (July 29, 2009), http://gary
miller.house.gov/News/DocumentSingle.aspx?DocumentlD=140048.
132. See id.
133. See Kiviat, supra note 33; Miller, supra note 131.
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programs created by lenders under the Neighborhood
Preservation Act presumably would avoid the disincentives
created by Baker's right to rent plan for lenders that pursue
foreclosures. 34  The legislation, if passed in its current form,
therefore, promises less of a means to combat the foreclosure
crisis, than an avenue for banks to create programs to address the
glut of foreclosed homes on market.
13 5
V. CONCLUSION
Dean Baker's right to rent plan would make the
foreclosure process more burdensome and less appealing by
imposing additional costs and obligations on lenders. 36 The plan
creates additional responsibilities and poses new challenges for
lenders. 1' Lenders would assume responsibility for overseeing and
138managing the property. It is also more difficult to sell homes
occupied by tenants, which may encourage lenders under a right to
rent system to renegotiate mortgages rather than pursue
foreclosure.3 9
While focusing on mortgage renegotiation, the right to rent
plan and existing government policies ignore other obstacles to
mortgage renegotiation and the prevention of foreclosures.
Renegotiating mortgage terms fails to address the root causes of
mortgagors defaulting on their loans, such as unemployment.
140
Focusing on promoting renegotiation may also ignore other
obstacles confronting lenders such as second liens and pooling and
134. Compare H.R. 2529 §3 (a) (providing a great deal of discretion to lending
institutions to structure the terms and conditions of lease programs), with BAKER,
PLAN, supra note 4, at 2 (empowering the courts to structure the terms and the
conditions of the right to rent in a manner that promotes renegotiation over
foreclosure).
135. See Miller, supra note 131.
136. Weaver, supra note 14, at 1-2.
137. Cf. Kiviat, supra note 33 (discussing some of the steps taken by Fannie Mae
to implement the D4L program and the reluctance of private lenders to do the same).
138. Cf. id. (stating that Fannie Mae hired a property management company to
oversee participating D4L properties).
139. See Baker, Own to Rent, supra note 10, at 2-3.
140. See Christopher L. Foote et al., Reducing Foreclosures 3, 34-35 (Fed. Reserve
Bank of Boston, Public Policy Discussion Paper, No. 09-2, 2009), available at
http://www.bos.frb.org/economic/ppdp/2009/ppdp0902.pdf.
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service agreement provisions.14 ' Despite interventions to increase
the number of mortgage renegotiations, foreclosure may remain a
more profitable option to lenders since current incentives fail to
142overcome the costs of renegotiation.
Therefore, government initiatives and the right to rent plan
may ultimately fail to prevent as many foreclosures as policy
makers would like. Depending on how greatly it increases
incentives to renegotiate, however, the right to rent plan could
help increase the number of mortgage modifications. Regardless
of the number of mortgage renegotiations the right to rent plan
encourages, it may still prove a better policy for keeping families
in their homes, even if that is as renters.
DANIEL J. BEHREND
141. See Christopher Mayer et al., A New Proposal for Loan Modifications, 26
YALE J. ON REG. 417,419 (2009).
142. See Manuel Adelino et al., Why Don't Lenders Renegotiate More Home
Mortgages? Redefaults, Self-Cures, and Securitization 25-26 (Fed. Reserve Bank of
Boston, Public Policy Discussion Paper, No. 09-4, 2009), available at www.bos.frb.org
/economic/ppdp/2009/ppdp0904.pdf (concluding that renegotiation is a costly option
for lenders because of the possible costs incurred from: [1] defaulting mortgagors
self-curing during renegotiation; and [2] mortgagors subsequently redefaulting after
a successful renegotiation).
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